

Chapter 11.00

MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENSES

Introduction to Money Laundering Instructions

(current through Jan. 1, 2024)

The main money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, defines the crime in three subsections. Subsection (a)(1) covers domestic financial transactions; subsection (a)(2) covers international transportations; subsection (a)(3) covers undercover investigations. Diagrams of the three subsections appear in the appendix.

The instructions describe the crimes of § 1956 in five instructions. Instructions 11.01 and 11.02 cover subsection (a)(1)(domestic financial transactions). Instructions 11.03 and 11.04 cover subsection (a)(2)(international transportations). Instruction 11.05 applies to subsection (a)(3)(undercover investigations).

The Committee drafted two instructions for each of the first two subsections, (a)(1) and (a)(2), mainly because of different mens rea options within each subsection. Under (a)(1), Instructions 11.01 and 11.02 (which reflect subsections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) respectively) are similar; the only difference is in the mens rea element. For (a)(1)(A), the mens rea is intent, either to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity (characterized as “promotional money laundering” in *United States v. McGahee*, 257 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2001)) or to violate certain tax laws. For (a)(1)(B), the mens rea is knowledge that the transaction was designed either to conceal the proceeds of specified unlawful activity (characterized as “concealment money laundering,” *id.*) or to avoid a reporting requirement.

Under § 1956(a)(2), Instructions 11.03 and 11.04 (which cover subsections (a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B) respectively) again reflect differences in the two subsections. The first difference is the mens rea. For (a)(2)(A), the mens rea is intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; for (a)(2)(B), the mens rea is knowing that the funds are proceeds of crime and knowing that the transaction was designed either to conceal the proceeds of specified unlawful activity or to avoid a reporting requirement. A second possible difference between the two subsections is less clear. This difference between (a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B) is that subsection (a)(2)(B) arguably requires that the funds involved be proceeds of unlawful activity whereas subsection (a)(2)(A) clearly does not. These distinctions are discussed in more detail in the commentaries to the instructions.

Section 1956(a)(3) is covered in Instruction 11.05.

The Committee also drafted Instruction 11.06 to cover the money laundering crime of Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity (18 U.S.C. § 1957).

Chapter 11.00

MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENSES

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11.01 MONEY LAUNDERING – Domestic Financial Transaction (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (A)(intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity))

(1) Count ____ of the indictment charges the defendant with [conducting] [attempting to conduct] a financial transaction in violation of federal law. For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must find that the government has proved each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

- (A) First, that the defendant [conducted] [attempted to conduct] a financial transaction.
- (B) Second, that the financial transaction involved property that represented the proceeds of [*insert the specified unlawful activity from § 1956(c)(7)*].
- (C) Third, that the defendant knew that the property involved in the financial transaction represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.
- (D) Fourth, that the defendant had the intent [to promote the carrying on of [*insert the specified unlawful activity from § 1956(c)(7)*]] [to engage in conduct violating §§ 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986].

(2) Now I will give you more detailed instructions on some of these terms.

- (A) The term “financial transaction” means [*insert definition from § 1956(c)(4)*].
- (B) [The term “financial institution” means [*insert definition from 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) or the regulations promulgated thereunder*]].
- (C) The word “conducts” includes initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating or concluding a transaction.
- (D) The word “proceeds” means any property [derived from] [obtained] [retained], directly or indirectly, through some form of unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such activity.
- (E) The phrase “knew that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity” means that the defendant knew the property involved in the transaction represented the proceeds of some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under state or federal [foreign] law. [The government does not have to prove the defendant knew the property involved represented proceeds of a felony as long as he knew the property involved represented proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.]

(3) If you are convinced that the government has proved all of these elements, say so by returning a guilty verdict on this charge. If you have a reasonable doubt about any one of these elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of this charge.

Use Note

Brackets indicate options for the court. Brackets with italics are notes to the court.

The definition of financial institution in paragraph (2)(B) should be given only when a financial institution is used to prove the presence of a financial transaction.

The final bracketed sentence in paragraph (2)(E) should be given only when the defendant raises as an issue whether he knew that the unlawful activity which generated the proceeds was a felony or a misdemeanor.

Committee Commentary Instruction 11.01

(current through Jan. 1, 2024)

The purpose of this instruction is to outline the elements of the crime of money laundering through a domestic financial transaction based on a mens rea of intent, which is characterized as “promotional money laundering.” *United States v. McGahee*, 257 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2001). The intent can be either to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity or to violate 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 or 7206 of the tax code. *See generally* 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). Subsections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) of § 1956 have been interpreted as alternative means of committing the same offense. *United States v. Navarro*, 145 F.3d 580, 592 (3d Cir. 1998). *See also* *United States v. Westine*, 1994 WL 88831, 1994 U.S.App. LEXIS 5144 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished). Thus, the instructions for subsections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) are similar; the difference is in the mens rea element. For (a)(1)(A), the mens rea is intent, either to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity or to violate certain tax laws. For (a)(1)(B), which is covered in the next instruction, the mens rea is knowledge that the transaction is designed either to conceal the proceeds of specified unlawful activity or to avoid a reporting requirement.

If the defendant is charged with intent to violate §§ 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7206, a supplemental instruction on these provisions should be given.

The definition of the term proceeds in paragraph (2)(D) is taken verbatim from the definition in § 1956(c)(9), effective May 20, 2009. Congress added this definition to the statute following the Supreme Court’s decision in *United States v. Santos*, 128 S.Ct. 2020 (2008) which stated in a plurality opinion that the term “proceeds” is limited to profits in a case where gambling was the specified unlawful activity.

In cases arising from conduct prior to May 20, 2009, the trial court must determine whether *Santos* applies to the specified unlawful activity at issue. *See, e.g., United States v. Kratt*, 2009 U.S.App.Lexis 19798, 2009 WL 2767152 (6th Cir. September 2, 2009), discussing *Santos* in a § 1957 money laundering case with bank fraud as the specified unlawful activity. The Sixth Circuit held that *Santos* applies to § 1957 money laundering cases, and that there is a rule of general applicability derived from *Santos* based on the “outcomes” upon which the

plurality in *Santos* and Justice Stevens, who wrote a concurring opinion, would agree. Specifically, in any case in which there is a “merger” problem and that merger problem results in the underlying crime being punishable by a significantly increased sentence because the money laundering statute was used, then “proceeds” must be construed to mean “profit.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction in *Kratt* because the statutory maximum sentence for bank fraud was actually higher than for money laundering. Since use of the money laundering statute did not expose the defendant to a significantly higher sentence for the underlying conduct, there was no *Santos* problem and circuit precedent construing “proceeds” to mean “gross receipts” controlled. See *United States v. Prince*, 214 F.3d 740, 747 (6th Cir. 2000); *United States v. Haun*, 90 F.3d 1096, 1101 (6th Cir. 1996).

The government does not have to trace the origin of all the proceeds involved in the financial transactions to determine precisely which proceeds were used for which transactions. *United States v. Jamieson*, 427 F.3d 394, 403-04 (6th Cir. 2005); *United States v. Bencs*, 28 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 1994). Also, the statute does not require that the entire property involved represent the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. *United States v. Conner*, 1991 WL 213756 at 4, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 25370 at 10 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished). As long as the jury can infer that a portion of the funds involved represented the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity, there is no minimum percentage requirement. *Westine*, 1994 WL at 2, 1994 U.S.App. LEXIS at 8.

It is an element of all crimes under subsection (a)(1) that the property involved in fact represent the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. See § 1956(a)(1). However, the defendant need only know that the property involved represents proceeds of some form of unlawful activity. The statute defines this mens rea in subsection (c)(1): “[T]he term ‘knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity’ means that the person knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under state, Federal or foreign law, regardless of whether or not such activity is specified in paragraph (7) [as specified unlawful activity].” This definition of the mens rea makes clear that although the property must actually represent proceeds of certain listed unlawful activities, the defendant need not know this. The government does not have to prove that the defendant knew the property represented proceeds of a particular type of unlawful activity as long as the defendant knew it represented proceeds of “some form of unlawful activity.”

The statute requires that the defendant know that the property involved in the financial transaction represented the proceeds of “some form of unlawful activity.” The statutory definition of this phrase is quoted *supra*. Subsection (a)(1) “does not require the government to prove that the defendant knew that the alleged unlawful activity was a felony . . . , as opposed to a misdemeanor, so long as the defendant knew that the laundered proceeds were derived from unlawful activity.” *United States v. Hill*, 167 F.3d 1055, 1065 (6th Cir. 1999).

In *United States v. Santos*, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2029 (2008), the plurality elaborated on methods of proving knowledge for the money laundering statute:

As for the knowledge element of the money-laundering offense— knowledge that

the transaction involves profits of unlawful activity—that will be provable (as knowledge must almost always be proved) by circumstantial evidence. For example, someone accepting receipts from what he knows to be a long-continuing drug-dealing operation can be found to know that they include some profits. And a jury could infer from a long-running launderer-criminal relationship that the launderer knew he was hiding the criminal's profits. Moreover, the Government will be entitled to a willful blindness instruction if the professional money launderer, aware of a high probability that the laundered funds were profits, deliberately avoids learning the truth about them—as might be the case when he knows that the underlying crime is one that is rarely unprofitable.

See also United States v. Bohn, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 12474 at 28, 2008 WL 2332226 at 10 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (“In this Circuit the knowledge requirements of § 1956 are construed to include instances of willful blindness.”) (*citing* United States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1067 (6th Cir. 1999)).

Conviction under this subsection of § 1956 can be based on an intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. Several Sixth Circuit cases have defined intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. In United States v. McGahee, *supra*, the court held that paying for personal goods, alone, was not sufficient to establish that the funds were used to promote an illegal activity. The court further stated that payment of the general business expenditures of a business that is used to defraud is not sufficient to establish promotion of the underlying crime; rather, the transaction “must be explicitly connected to the mechanism of the crime.” *McGahee*, 257 F.3d at 527, *citing* United States v. Brown, 186 F.3d 661, 669-70 (5th Cir. 1999). *See also* *Haun*, 90 F.3d 1096 (evidence of promotion sufficient when checks for proceeds of fraudulent car sales were cashed or deposited into company’s bank account); United States v. Reed, 167 F.3d 984, 992-93 (6th Cir. 1999) (evidence of promotion sufficient when money used to pay antecedent drug debt and ease payer/defendant’s position); United States v. King, 169 F.3d 1035 (6th Cir. 1999) (evidence of promotion sufficient when proceeds used to pay for drugs).

The presence of four options for proving mens rea under subsection (a)(1) has raised unanimity issues. The Sixth Circuit has not addressed the question of whether an augmented unanimity instruction is required, but it has characterized subsections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) as alternative bases for a conviction either of which is sufficient. *Westine*, 1994 WL at 2, 1994 U.S. App. Lexis at 7. Other circuits have found that a specific unanimity instruction is not required; rather, a general unanimity instruction is sufficient. These courts have concluded that the alternative mental states of subsection (a)(1) do not constitute multiple crimes but rather separate means of committing a single crime. *Navarro*, 145 F.3d at 592 n.6 (3d Cir. 1998) *citing* United States v. Holmes, 44 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (2d Cir. 1995) ((B)(i) and (B)(ii) are alternative improper purposes for single crime under (a)(1)). The Third Circuit reasoned that the fact that multiple purposes could satisfy the end of money laundering did not mean that Congress intended to create multiple offenses. Thus the absence of a specific unanimity instruction was not plain error. (This holding was limited in two ways: although a specific unanimity instruction was not given, a general one was; and the court was reviewing only for plain error. Whether the court would decide the same way without these two conditions is unclear.) The Eighth Circuit has reached the same conclusion, finding that subsections (A)(i) and (B)(i) are two mens rea options

under the one crime stated in (a)(1), so giving a general unanimity instruction rather than a specific one was not error. *United States v. Nattier*, 127 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1997). These cases suggest that giving Pattern Instruction 8.03 Unanimous Verdict is sufficient and that giving an augmented unanimity instruction is not required in § 1956(a)(1) prosecutions involving multiple mental states. *See also* Instruction 8.03B Unanimity Not Required – Means.

Attempted money laundering is also a crime under § 1956. If the crime of attempt is charged, the instructions should be supplemented by the instructions in Chapter 5.00 on Attempts.

The Committee recommends against giving an instruction recounting the statutory language because it would be difficult for the jury to absorb. See the Committee Commentary to Instruction 2.02.

11.02 MONEY LAUNDERING – Domestic Financial Transaction (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) (knowing the transaction is designed to conceal facts related to proceeds))

(1) Count _____ of the indictment charges the defendant with [conducting] [attempting to conduct] a financial transaction in violation of federal law. For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must find that the government has proved each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

- (A) First, that the defendant [conducted] [attempted to conduct] a financial transaction.
- (B) Second, that the financial transaction involved property that represented the proceeds of [*insert the specified unlawful activity from § 1956(c)(7)*].
- (C) Third, that the defendant knew that the property involved in the financial transaction represented the proceeds from some form of unlawful activity.
- (D) Fourth, that the defendant knew that the transaction was designed in whole or in part
 - [to conceal or disguise the [nature] [location] [source] [ownership] [control] of the proceeds of [*insert the specified unlawful activity from § 1956(c)(7)*]]
 - [to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state or federal law].

(2) Now I will give you more detailed instructions on some of these terms.

- (A) The term “financial transaction” means [insert the definition from § 1956(c)(4)].
- (B) [The term “financial institution” means [*insert definition from 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) or the regulations promulgated thereunder*]].
- (C) The word “conducts” includes initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating or concluding a transaction.
- (D) The word “proceeds” means any property [derived from] [obtained] [retained], directly or indirectly, through some form of unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such activity.
- (E) The phrase “knew that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity” means that the defendant knew the funds involved in the transaction represented the proceeds of some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under state or federal [foreign] law. [The government does not have to prove the defendant knew the property involved represented proceeds of a felony as long as he knew the property involved represented proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.]

(3) If you are convinced that the government has proved all of these elements, say so by returning a guilty verdict on this charge. If you have a reasonable doubt about any one of these elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of this charge.

Use Note

Brackets indicate options for the court. Brackets with italics are notes to the court.

The definition of financial institution in paragraph (2)(B) should be given only when a financial institution is used to prove the presence of a financial transaction.

The final bracketed sentence in paragraph (2)(E) should be given only when the defendant raises an issue on whether he knew that the unlawful activity which generated the proceeds was a felony or misdemeanor.

Committee Commentary Instruction 11.02

(current through Jan. 1, 2024)

The purpose of this instruction is to outline the elements of the crime of money laundering through a domestic financial transaction based on a mens rea of knowledge that the transaction is designed to conceal facts related to proceeds. *See generally* § 1956(a)(1). The court has characterized this as “concealment money laundering,” *see* *United States v. McGahee*, 257 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2001). Subsections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) of § 1956 have been interpreted as alternative means of committing the same offense. *United States v. Navarro*, 145 F.3d 580, 592 (3rd Cir. 1998). *See also* *United States v. Westine*, 1994 WL 88831, 1994 U.S.App. LEXIS 5144 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished). Thus, the instructions for subsections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) are similar; the difference is in the mens rea element. For subsection (a)(1)(A), covered in the preceding instruction, the statutory mens rea is intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. For subsection (a)(1)(B), the statutory mens rea is knowledge that the transaction has particular purposes. The Sixth Circuit has acknowledged the mens rea for subsection (a)(1)(B) as knowledge, *see* *United States v. Moss*, 9 F.3d 543, 551 (6th Cir. 1993), *but see* *United States v. Loehr*, 966 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1992) (mens rea for (a)(1)(B) is intent) and *United States v. Beddow*, 957 F.2d 1330, 1334-35 (6th Cir. 1992) (same). The pattern instruction tracks the statutory language. The mens rea for subsection (a)(1)(B) offenses is discussed further below.

The term “financial transaction” is defined in subsection 1956(c)(4). Some examples of covered transactions include transactions at financial institutions (e.g., deposits, withdrawals, check cashings); transfers of title to real estate, cars, boats and aircraft; and wire transfers. The Committee recommends that the court define financial transaction by quoting only the specific portion of the definition involved in the case.

The definition of the term proceeds in paragraph (2)(D) is taken verbatim from the definition in § 1956(c)(9), effective May 20, 2009. Congress added this definition to the statute

following the Supreme Court's decision in *United States v. Santos*, 128 S.Ct. 2020 (2008) which stated in a plurality opinion that the term "proceeds" is limited to profits in a case where gambling was the specified unlawful activity.

In cases arising from conduct prior to May 20, 2009, the trial court must determine whether *Santos* applies to the specified unlawful activity at issue. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Kratt*, 2009 U.S.App.Lexis 19798, 2009 WL 2767152 (6th Cir. September 2, 2009), discussing *Santos* in a § 1957 money laundering case with bank fraud as the specified unlawful activity. The Sixth Circuit held that *Santos* applies to § 1957 money laundering cases, and that there is a rule of general applicability derived from *Santos* based on the "outcomes" upon which the plurality in *Santos* and Justice Stevens, who wrote a concurring opinion, would agree. Specifically, in any case in which there is a "merger" problem and that merger problem results in the underlying crime being punishable by a significantly increased sentence because the money laundering statute was used, then "proceeds" must be construed to mean "profit." The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction in *Kratt* because the statutory maximum sentence for bank fraud was actually higher than for money laundering. Since use of the money laundering statute did not expose the defendant to a significantly higher sentence for the underlying conduct, there was no *Santos* problem and circuit precedent construing "proceeds" to mean "gross receipts" controlled. *See United States v. Prince*, 214 F.3d 740, 747 (6th Cir. 2000); *United States v. Haun*, 90 F.3d 1096, 1101 (6th Cir. 1996).

The government does not have to trace the origin of all the proceeds involved in the financial transactions to determine precisely which proceeds were used for which transactions. *United States v. Jamieson*, 427 F.3d 394, 403-04 (6th Cir. 2005); *United States v. Bencs*, 28 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 1994). Also, the statute does not require that the entire property involved represent the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. *United States v. Conner*, 1991 WL 213756 at 4, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 25370 at 10 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished). As long as the jury can infer that a portion of the funds involved represented the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity, there is no minimum percentage requirement. *United States v. Westine*, 1994 WL 88831, 2, 1994 U.S.App. LEXIS 5144, 8 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished).

It is an element of all crimes under (a)(1) that the property involved in fact represent the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. *See* § 1956(a)(1). However, the defendant need only know that the property involved represents proceeds of some form of unlawful activity. The statute defines this mens rea in subsection (c)(1): "[T]he term 'knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity' means that the person knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State, Federal or foreign law, regardless of whether or not such activity is specified in paragraph (7) [as specified unlawful activity]." This definition of the mens rea makes clear that although the property must actually represent proceeds of certain listed unlawful activities, the defendant need not know this. The government does not have to prove that the defendant knew the property represented proceeds of a particular type of unlawful activity as long as the defendant knew it represented proceeds of "some form of unlawful activity."

The statute requires that the defendant know that the property involved in the financial

transaction represented the proceeds of “some form of unlawful activity.” The statutory definition of this phrase is quoted in the preceding paragraph. Subsection (a)(1) “does not require the government to prove that the defendant knew that the alleged unlawful activity was a felony . . . , as opposed to a misdemeanor, so long as the defendant knew that the laundered proceeds were derived from unlawful activity.” *United States v. Hill*, 167 F.3d 1055, 1065 (6th Cir. 1999).

In *United States v. Santos*, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2029 (2008), the plurality elaborated on proving knowledge for the money laundering statute:

As for the knowledge element of the money-laundering offense—knowledge that the transaction involves profits of unlawful activity—that will be provable (as knowledge must almost always be proved) by circumstantial evidence. For example, someone accepting receipts from what he knows to be a long-continuing drug-dealing operation can be found to know that they include some profits. And a jury could infer from a long-running launderer-criminal relationship that the launderer knew he was hiding the criminal's profits. Moreover, the Government will be entitled to a willful blindness instruction if the professional money launderer, aware of a high probability that the laundered funds were profits, deliberately avoids learning the truth about them—as might be the case when he knows that the underlying crime is one that is rarely unprofitable.

See also *United States v. Bohn*, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 12474 at 28, 2008 WL 2332226 at 10 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (“In this Circuit the knowledge requirements of § 1956 are construed to include instances of willful blindness.”) (*citing* *United States v. Hill*, 167 F.3d 1055, 1067 (6th Cir. 1999)).

Under § 1956(a)(1)(B), the government must prove that the defendant engaged in a financial transaction in addition to the acquisition of the unlawful proceeds. *United States v. Hamrick*, 983 F.2d 1069 (6th Cir. 1992). The financial transaction must go beyond the defendant’s involvement in the underlying specified unlawful activity. *Id.*

Proof that the defendant knew that a transaction was designed to conceal or disguise facts requires that concealment be “an animating purpose” of the transaction. *United States v. Faulkenberry*, 614 F.3d 573, 586 (6th Cir. 2010). In *Faulkenberry*, the court reversed a conviction for concealment money laundering under subsection § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) based on insufficient evidence that the defendant had that animating purpose. *Id.* at 587. The court relied on *Cuellar v. United States*, 128 S. Ct. 1994 (2008) (construing § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i); see discussion in commentary to Inst. 11.04 International Transportation). In *Faulkenberry*, the court elaborated:

To prove a violation of [concealment laundering under subsection 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)], therefore, it is not enough for the government to prove merely that a transaction had a concealing effect. Nor is it enough that the transaction was *structured* to conceal the nature of illicit funds. Concealment—even deliberate concealment—as mere facilitation of some *other* purpose, is not enough to convict (*quoting Cuellar* at 2005 for the conclusion that evidence was insufficient to convict where it suggested that the secretive aspects of the transportation were employed to *facilitate* the transportation, but not necessarily that secrecy was the

purpose of the transportation⁵) (emphasis in original). What is required, rather, is that concealment be an animating purpose of the transaction (*citing Cuellar* at 2003).

That is not to say, of course, that concealment must be the *only* purpose of the transaction; the statute requires only that the transaction be designed ⁶in whole or *in part* ⁷to conceal. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Moreover, ⁸purpose and structure are often related[,] ⁹*Cuellar*; 128 S.Ct. at 2004; and thus, depending on context, proof that a transaction was structured to conceal a listed attribute of the funds can yield an inference that concealment was a purpose of the transaction. *See id.* at 2004-¹⁰2005. But the ultimate question under the statute is one of purpose, not structure.

Faulkenberry, supra at 586.

Proof that the defendant knew that a transaction was designed to conceal or disguise facts related to the proceeds requires the government to introduce more evidence than the simple fact of a retail purchase using illegally obtained money. *United States v. Marshall*, 248 F.3d 525, 538 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit declined to infer evidence of a design to disguise proceeds solely because the defendant bought items with investment value and the defendant bought items from a pool of money derived from another illegal transaction. *Marshall*, 248 F.3d at 539-41. The court commented, “We are also of the opinion that a few isolated purchases of wearable or consumable items directly by the wrongdoer is not the type of money-laundering transaction that Congress had in mind when it enacted § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), especially where the value of the items is relatively small in relation to the amount stolen by the defendant.” *Id.* at 541. *See also McGahee*, 257 F.3d at 527-28.

The transaction reporting requirements under federal law referred to in paragraph (D) of the instruction include at least the three reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5314, 5316 and the trade or business transaction reporting requirement under 26 U.S.C. § 6050I. Of course, the statutory language, which refers only to “a transaction reporting requirement under state or federal law,” may also include other reporting requirements.

The presence of four options for proving mens rea under subsection (a)(1) has raised unanimity issues. The Sixth Circuit has not addressed the question of whether an augmented unanimity instruction is required, but it has characterized subsections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) as alternative bases for a conviction either of which is sufficient. *Westine*, 1994 WL at 2, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS at 7. Other circuits have found that a specific unanimity instruction is not required; rather, a general unanimity instruction is sufficient. These courts have concluded that the alternative mens reas of subsection (a)(1) do not constitute multiple crimes but rather separate means of committing a single crime. *Navarro*, 145 F.3d at 592 n.6 (3d Cir. 1998), *citing* *United States v. Holmes*, 44 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (2d Cir. 1995) ((B)(i) and (B)(ii) are alternative improper purposes for single crime under (a)(1)). The Third Circuit reasoned that the fact that multiple purposes could satisfy the end of money laundering did not mean that Congress intended to create multiple offenses. Thus the absence of a specific unanimity instruction was not plain error. (This holding was limited in two ways: although a specific unanimity instruction was not

given, a general one was; and the court was reviewing only for plain error. Whether the court would decide the same way without these two conditions is unclear.) The Eighth Circuit has reached the same conclusion, finding that subsections (A)(i) and (B)(i) are two mens rea options under the one crime stated in (a)(1), so giving a general unanimity instruction rather than a specific one was not error. *United States v. Nattier*, 127 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1997). These cases suggest that giving Pattern Instruction 8.03 Unanimous Verdict is sufficient and that giving an augmented unanimity instruction is not required in § 1956(a)(1) prosecutions involving multiple mental states. *See also* Instruction 8.03B Unanimity Not Required – Means.

**11.03 MONEY LAUNDERING – International Transportation (18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A)(intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity))**

(1) Count ____ of the indictment charges the defendant with [attempting to] [transport[ing]] [transmit[ting]] [transfer[ring]] a monetary instrument or funds in violation of federal law. For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must find that the government has proved each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(A) First, that the defendant [attempted to] [transport[ed]] [transmit[ted]] [transfer[red]] a monetary instrument or funds.

(B) Second, that the defendant's [attempted] [transportation] [transmission] [transfer] was [from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United States] [to a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United States].

(C) Third, that the defendant's [attempted] [transportation] [transmission] [transfer] of the monetary instrument or funds was done with the intent to promote the carrying on of [insert the specified unlawful activity from § 1956(c)(7)].

(2) Now I will give you more detailed instructions on some of these terms.

(A) The term “monetary instruments” means

--[coin or currency of the United States, or of any other country]

--[travelers' checks]

--[personal checks]

--[bank checks]

--[money orders]

--[investment securities or negotiable instruments, in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title passes upon delivery].

(3) If you are convinced that the government has proved all of these elements, say so by returning a guilty verdict on this charge. If you have a reasonable doubt about any one of these elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of this charge.

Use Note

Brackets indicate options for the court.

(current through Jan. 1, 2024)

The purpose of this instruction is to outline the elements of the crime of money laundering through international transportation of monetary instruments or funds with the intent to promote specified unlawful activity as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A). Subsection (a)(2)(A) has two important characteristics. First, it is based on a mens rea of intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, as contrasted with the other part of (a)(2) which is based on a mens rea of knowledge. Second, subsection (a)(2)(A) contains no requirement that the funds be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. In other words, the monetary instrument or funds need not be dirty; the money used by the defendant under this subsection can be from a completely legitimate source. It is how the money was used, not how it was generated, that defines the defendant's conduct as criminal. *See generally* United States v. Hamilton, 931 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670 (2d Cir. 1994).

As paragraph (1)(C) states, the mens rea element is that the defendant transported the funds with the “intent to promote” the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. United States v. Maddux, 917 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting § 1956(a)(2)(A)). The court sometimes refers to this mens rea as the “specific” intent to promote, *see Maddux* at 446. The statute uses the term “intent to promote,” *see* § 1956(a)(2)(A). The instruction tracks the statutory language. *See also* Inst. 2.07 Specific Intent (recommending no general instruction on that term). In *Maddux*, the court concluded there was sufficient evidence that the defendants conspired to launder money by transferring money internationally in furtherance of a scheme to defraud the federal and state governments of tax revenues. *Id.* at 447. *See also* United States v. Bohn, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 12474 at 29-31, 2008 WL 2332226 at 10 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (concluding it is sufficient for the government to prove that the defendant transferred checks generated by the underlying fraud scheme and noting that the Sixth Circuit has followed the line of cases holding that transferring or cashing a check is sufficient evidence of promoting the prior unlawful activity) (*quoting* United States v. Reed, 167 F.3d 984, 992 (6th Cir. 1999) and *citing* United States v. Haun, 90 F.3d 1096, 1100 (6th Cir. 1996)).

Subsection 1956(a)(2) can be prosecuted with either of two mental states, *see* subsections (a)(2)(A) (intent) and (a)(2)(B) (knowing). A panel of the Sixth Circuit has characterized these as alternative bases for a conviction either of which is sufficient. United States v. Bohn, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 12474 at 31-32, 2008 WL 2332226 at 11 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). This case suggests that giving Instruction 8.03 Unanimous Verdict is sufficient and that giving an augmented unanimity instruction is not required in § 1956(a)(2) prosecutions where the government alleges multiple mental states. *See also* Instruction 8.03B Unanimity Not Required – Means.

11.04 MONEY LAUNDERING – International Transportation (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B) (knowing that the transportation involves proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and that it is designed to conceal facts related to proceeds))

(1) Count _____ of the indictment charges the defendant with [attempting to] [transport[ing]] [transmit[ting]] [transfer[ring]] a monetary instrument or funds in violation of federal law. For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must find that the government has proved each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(A) First, that the defendant [attempted to] [transport[ed]] [transmit[ted]] [transfer[red]] a monetary instrument or funds.

(B) Second, that the defendant's [attempted] [transportation] [transmission] [transfer] was [from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United States] [to a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United States].

(C) Third, that the defendant knew that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the [transportation] [transmission] [transfer] represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.

(D) Fourth, that the defendant knew that the [transportation] [transmission] [transfer] was designed in whole or in part

--[to conceal or disguise the [nature] [location] [source] [ownership] [control] of the proceeds of [*insert the specified unlawful activity from § 1956(c)(7)*]]

--[to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state or federal law].

(2) Now I will give you more detailed instructions on some of these terms.

(A) The term “monetary instruments” means

--[coin or currency of the United States, or of any other country]

--[travelers' checks]

--[personal checks]

--[bank checks]

--[money orders]

--[investment securities or negotiable instruments, in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title passes upon delivery].

(B) The word “proceeds” means any property [derived from] [obtained] [retained],

directly or indirectly, through some form of unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such activity.

(3) If you are convinced that the government has proved all of these elements, say so by returning a guilty verdict on this charge. If you have a reasonable doubt about any one of these elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of this charge.

Use Note

Brackets indicate options for the court. Brackets with italics are notes to the court.

Committee Commentary Instruction 11.04 (current through Jan. 1, 2024)

The purpose of this instruction is to outline the elements of the crime of money laundering through international transportation of monetary instruments or funds based on a mens rea of knowledge under subsection (a)(2)(B). In *Cuellar v. United States*, 128 S.Ct. 1994 (2008), the Court identified three elements the government was required to prove for a conviction under § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i): (1) that defendant attempted international transport of the funds; (2) that defendant knew that the funds represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity; and (3) that defendant knew that the transportation was designed to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the funds. *Id.* at 2002. The elements of the crime identified in paragraph (1) of the instruction repeat these elements with a minor variation (in the instruction, the requirement of international transportation is subdivided into two elements).

Beyond the transportation or attempted transportation, the government must prove that the defendant had two types of knowledge. See *Cuellar, supra* at 2002 (listing the two types of knowledge involved in that case). First, the defendant must know that the instruments or funds represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity. Second, the defendant must know that the transportation, transmission or transfer was designed in whole or in part either (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement. In order to prove the second type of knowledge under subsection (i) (that defendant knew the transportation was designed at least in part to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds), the government must prove that the purpose of the transportation was to conceal or disguise. This element (that the defendant knew the transportation was designed to conceal or disguise) cannot be satisfied solely by evidence that the defendant concealed funds during transport. *Cuellar, supra* at 2005-06.

In the Sixth Circuit, “the knowledge requirements of § 1956 are construed to include instances of willful blindness.” *United States v. Bohn*, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 12474 at 28, 2008 WL 2332226 at 10 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (*citing* *United States v. Hill*, 167 F.3d 1055, 1067 (6th Cir. 1999)).

In *Cuellar*, the Court further held that in order to prove the transportation was “designed . . . to conceal . . . the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds,” the government was not required to prove that the transportation was designed to create the appearance of legitimate wealth. *Cuellar, supra* at 2000-2001.

The definition of the term proceeds in paragraph (2)(B) is taken verbatim from the definition in § 1956(c)(9), effective May 20, 2009. Congress added this definition to the statute following the Supreme Court’s decision in *United States v. Santos*, 128 S.Ct. 2020 (2008) (interpreting subsection (a)(1) of the statute) which stated in a plurality opinion that the term “proceeds” is limited to profits in a case where gambling was the specified unlawful activity.

In cases arising from conduct prior to May 20, 2009, the trial court must determine whether *Santos* applies to the specified unlawful activity at issue. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Kratt*, 2009 U.S.App.Lexis 19798, 2009 WL 2767152 (6th Cir. September 2, 2009), discussing *Santos* in a § 1957 money laundering case with bank fraud as the specified unlawful activity. The Sixth Circuit held that *Santos* applies to § 1957 money laundering cases, and that there is a rule of general applicability derived from *Santos* based on the “outcomes” upon which the plurality in *Santos* and Justice Stevens, who wrote a concurring opinion, would agree. Specifically, in any case in which there is a “merger” problem and that merger problem results in the underlying crime being punishable by a significantly increased sentence because the money laundering statute was used, then “proceeds” must be construed to mean “profit.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction in *Kratt* because the statutory maximum sentence for bank fraud was actually higher than for money laundering. Since use of the money laundering statute did not expose the defendant to a significantly higher sentence for the underlying conduct, there was no *Santos* problem and circuit precedent construing “proceeds” to mean “gross receipts” controlled. *See United States v. Prince*, 214 F.3d 740, 747 (6th Cir. 2000); *United States v. Haun*, 90 F.3d 1096, 1101 (6th Cir. 1996).

The government does not have to trace the origin of all the proceeds involved in the financial transactions to determine precisely which proceeds were used for which transactions. *United States v. Jamieson*, 427 F.3d 394, 403-04 (6th Cir. 2005); *United States v. Bencs*, 28 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 1994). Also, the statute does not require that the entire property involved represent the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. *United States v. Conner*, 1991 WL 213756 at 4, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 25370 at 10 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished). As long as the jury can infer that a portion of the funds involved represented the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity, there is no minimum percentage requirement. *United States v. Westine*, 1994 WL 88831, 2, 1994 U.S.App. LEXIS 5144, 8 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished).

Subsection 1956(a)(2) can be prosecuted with either of two mental states, *see* subsections (a)(2)(A) (intent) and (a)(2)(B) (knowing). A panel of the Sixth Circuit has characterized these as alternative bases for a conviction either of which is sufficient. *United States v. Bohn*, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 12474 at 31-32, 2008 WL 2332226 at 11 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). This case suggests that giving Instruction 8.03 Unanimous Verdict is sufficient and that giving an augmented unanimity instruction is not required in § 1956(a)(2) prosecutions where the government alleges multiple mental states. *See also* Instruction 8.03B Unanimity Not Required – Means.

11.05 MONEY LAUNDERING –Undercover Investigation (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3))

(1) Count ____ of the indictment charges the defendant with [conducting] [attempting to conduct] a financial transaction in violation of federal law. For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must find that the government has proved each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(A) First, that the defendant [conducted] [attempted to conduct] a financial transaction.

(B) Second, that the property involved in the financial transaction was represented to be [the proceeds of *[insert the specified unlawful activity from § 1956(c)(7)]*] [property used to conduct or facilitate *[insert the specified unlawful activity from § 1956(c)(7)]*].

(C) Third, that the defendant had the intent

– [to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity]

– [to conceal or disguise the [nature] [location] [source] [ownership] [control] of property believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity]

– [to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state or federal [or foreign] law].

(2) Now I will give you more detailed instructions on some of these terms.

(A) The term “financial transaction” means *[insert definition from § 1956(c)(4)]*.

(B) [The term “financial institution” means *[insert definition from 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) or the regulations promulgated thereunder]*].

(C) The word “conducts” includes initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating or concluding a transaction.

(D) The word “proceeds” means any property [derived from] [obtained] [retained], directly or indirectly, through some form of unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such activity.

(3) If you are convinced that the government has proved all of these elements, say so by returning a guilty verdict on this charge. If you have a reasonable doubt about any one of these elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of this charge.

Use Note

Brackets indicate options for the court. Brackets with italics are notes to the court.

The definition of financial institution in paragraph (2)(B) should be given only when a

financial institution is used to prove the presence of a financial transaction.

Committee Commentary Instruction 11.05

(current through Jan. 1, 2024)

The purpose of this instruction is to outline the elements of the crime of money laundering through a government undercover investigation as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3). Subsection (a)(3) combines parts of subsections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B). One difference in subsection (a)(3) is that the property involved need only be “represented” to be the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity. The funds used by law enforcement officials to pursue the undercover investigation need not be unlawfully generated. It is only necessary that the defendant “believed” the funds to be the proceeds of other crimes. *United States v. Palazzolo*, 1995 WL 764416 at 4, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 36853 at 10-11 (6th Cir. 1995) (unpublished). The representations made by law enforcement officials must relate to the specified unlawful activity. *United States v. Loehr*, 966 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1992).

A second difference between § 1956(a)(3) and (a)(1) is that subsection (a)(3) requires a mens rea of intent whereas some parts of subsection (a)(1) allow the lesser mens rea of knowing. *See* subsection (a)(1)(B). Congress intended this difference to “fine tune” the sting provision. *See* 134 Cong. Rec. § S17,365 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988).

The involvement of a financial institution may be used to establish the presence of a financial transaction. *See* § 1956(c)(4). The term “financial institution” is defined in § 1956(c)(6) by reference to 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (a)(2) or the regulations thereunder.

The definition of the term proceeds in paragraph (2)(D) is taken verbatim from the definition in § 1956(c)(9), effective May 20, 2009. Congress added this definition to the statute following the Supreme Court’s decision in *United States v. Santos*, 128 S.Ct. 2020 (2008) which stated in a plurality opinion that the term “proceeds” is limited to profits in a case where gambling was the specified unlawful activity.

In cases arising from conduct prior to May 20, 2009, the trial court must determine whether *Santos* applies to the specified unlawful activity at issue. *See, e.g., United States v. Kratt*, 2009 U.S.App.Lexis 19798, 2009 WL 2767152 (6th Cir. September 2, 2009), discussing *Santos* in a § 1957 money laundering case with bank fraud as the specified unlawful activity. The Sixth Circuit held that *Santos* applies to § 1957 money laundering cases, and that there is a rule of general applicability derived from *Santos* based on the “outcomes” upon which the plurality in *Santos* and Justice Stevens, who wrote a concurring opinion, would agree. Specifically, in any case in which there is a “merger” problem and that merger problem results in the underlying crime being punishable by a significantly increased sentence because the money laundering statute was used, then “proceeds” must be construed to mean “profit.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction in *Kratt* because the statutory maximum sentence for bank fraud was actually higher than for money laundering. Since use of the money laundering statute did not expose the defendant to a significantly higher sentence for the underlying conduct, there was no *Santos* problem and circuit precedent construing “proceeds” to mean “gross receipts” controlled. *See*

United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 747 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Haun, 90 F.3d 1096, 1101 (6th Cir. 1996).

The government does not have to trace the origin of all the proceeds involved in the financial transactions to determine precisely which proceeds were used for which transactions. United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 403-04 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bencs, 28 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 1994). Also, the statute does not require that the entire property involved represent the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. United States v. Conner, 1991 WL 213756 at 4, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 25370 at 10 (6th Cir. 1991)(unpublished). As long as the jury can infer that a portion of the funds involved represented the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity, there is no minimum percentage requirement. United States v. Westine, 1994 WL 88831, 2, 1994 U.S.App. LEXIS 5144, 8 (6th Cir. 1994)(unpublished).

11.06 MONEY LAUNDERING – Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity (18 U.S.C. § 1957)

(1) Count ____ of the indictment charges the defendant with [engaging] [attempting to engage] in a monetary transaction in violation of federal law. For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must find that the government has proved each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(A) First, that the defendant knowingly [engaged] [attempted to engage] in a monetary transaction.

(B) Second, that the monetary transaction was in property derived from specified unlawful activity.

(C) Third, that the property had a value greater than \$10,000.

(D) Fourth, that the defendant knew that the transaction was in criminally derived property.

(E) Fifth, that the monetary transaction took place [within the United States] [within the United States' jurisdiction] [outside the United States but the defendant is a United States person].

(2) Now I will give you more detailed instructions on some of these terms.

(A) The term “monetary transaction” means [*insert definition from § 1957(f)(1)*].

(B) The term “specified unlawful activity” means [*insert definition from § 1956(c)(7)*].

(C) The term “criminally derived property” means any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense.

(D) [The term “United States person” includes [*insert definition from 18 U.S.C. § 3077*]].

(3) If you are convinced that the government has proved all of these elements, say so by returning a guilty verdict on this charge. If you have a reasonable doubt about any one of these elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of this charge.

Use Note

Brackets indicate options for the court. Brackets with italics are notes to the court.

Committee Commentary Instruction 11.06
(current through Jan. 1, 2024)

The purpose of this instruction is to outline the elements of the crime of engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity. The instruction is based primarily on *United States v. Rayborn*, 491 F.3d 513, 517 (6th Cir. 2007).

The term “specified unlawful activity” is defined in § 1957(f)(3) by reference to § 1956(c)(7).

The term “criminally derived property” is defined in § 1957(f)(2).

It is an element that the property in the monetary transaction must in fact be the proceeds of *specified unlawful activity*. See § 1957(a). However, the defendant need only know that the property involved was *criminally derived*. The statute makes this clear in § 1957(c), which states: “In a prosecution for an offense under this section, the Government is not required to prove the defendant knew that the offense from which the criminally derived property was derived was specified unlawful activity.” Thus, although the property must in fact be derived from the certain listed crimes constituting specified unlawful activity, the defendant need not know this. The government does not have to prove that the defendant knew the property was derived from a particular type of unlawful activity as long as the government proves that defendant knew it was criminally derived.

In order for property to qualify as criminally derived under § 1957, the underlying criminal activity must have been completed and the defendant must have obtained or controlled the tainted funds. The court explained, “[B]oth the plain language of § 1957 and the legislative history behind it suggest that Congress targeted only those transactions occurring *after* the proceeds have been obtained from the underlying unlawful activity.” *United States v. Rayborn*, 491 F.3d 513, 517 (6th Cir. 2007), *quoting* *United States v. Butler*, 211 F.3d 826, 829 (4th Cir. 2000). To meet this element, the funds need not be in the defendant's physical possession or in a personal bank account, as long as he exercised control over the funds. *Rayborn*, *supra* at 517-18. This element was established in *Rayborn* when the defendant signed documents directing a bank to transfer the funds to another agent. See also *United States v. Griffith*, 17 F.3d 865, 878-79 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirming defendant’s § 1957 conviction because he was in control of the criminally derived property before he engaged in the illegal monetary transaction).

Jurisdiction for § 1957 is based on the monetary transaction affecting interstate or foreign commerce. See § 1957(f)(1). The government need show only a *de minimus* effect upon commerce; this standard for § 1957 was not affected by *United States v. Lopez*, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). *United States v. Ables*, 167 F.3d 1021, 1029-30 (6th Cir. 1999). However, “the government still must prove that the transaction involved had at least some impact on interstate commerce.” *United States v. Peterson*, 1999 WL 685917, 10, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20336, 28 (6th Cir. 1999)(unpublished)(convictions reversed because no participation in or effect on commerce).

Attempted money laundering is also a crime under § 1957. If the crime of attempt is

charged, the instructions should be supplemented by the instructions in Chapter 5.00 on Attempts.

The Committee recommends against giving an instruction recounting the statutory language because it would be difficult for the jury to absorb. See the Committee Commentary to Instruction 2.02.