**Chapter 4.00**

**AIDING AND ABETTING**

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**4.01 AIDING AND ABETTING**

(1) For you to find \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ guilty of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_, it is not necessary for you to find that he

personally committed the crime. You may also find him guilty if he intentionally helped [or

encouraged] someone else to commit the crime. A person who does this is called an aider and

abettor.

(2) But for you to find \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ guilty of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ as an aider and abettor, you must be

convinced that the government has proved each and every one of the following elements beyond

a reasonable doubt:

(A) First, that the crime of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ was committed.

(B) Second, that the defendant helped to commit the crime [or encouraged someone else

to commit the crime].

(C) And third, that the defendant intended to help commit [or encourage] the crime.

(3) Proof that the defendant may have known about the crime, even if he was there when it was

committed, is not enough for you to find him guilty. You can consider this in deciding whether

the government has proved that he was an aider and abettor, but without more it is not enough.

(4) What the government must prove is that the defendant did something to help [or encourage]

the crime with the intent that the crime be committed.

(5) If you are convinced that the government has proved all of these elements, say so by

returning a guilty verdict on this charge. If you have a reasonable doubt about any one of these

elements, then you cannot find the defendant guilty of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ as an aider and abettor.

**Use Note**

If the underlying crime is based on 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), *i.e.*, Using or Carrying a Firearm

During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence or Drug Trafficking Crime (see Instruction 12.02)

or Possessing a Firearm in Furtherance of a Crime of Violence or Drug Trafficking Crime (see

Instruction 12.03), use the accomplice liability instructions provided for those particular crimes

in Instructions 12.04 and 12.05 respectively.

The bracketed language in paragraphs (1), (2)(B), (2)(C) and (4) should be included when there

is evidence that the defendant counseled, commanded, induced or procured the commission of

the crime.

**Committee Commentary 4.01**

(current through May 1, 2025)

In United States v. Katuramu, 2006 WL 773038, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 7640 (6th Cir.

2006) (unpublished), a panel approved Instruction 4.01(3) and (4).

The standard for accomplice liability is set out in 18 U.S.C. § 2:

(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States, or aids, abets, counsels,

commands, induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.

(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done, which if directly performed by him or

another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.

A defendant need not be specifically charged with aiding and abetting to be convicted

under 18 U.S.C. § 2, but can be charged as a principal and convicted as an aider and abettor.

Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980)**.** The district court may give an instruction on

aiding and abetting as an alternative theory even if the indictment does not include aiding and

abetting language and does not refer to the aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2. United

States v. McGee, 529 F.3d 691, 695-96 (6th Cir. 2008).

In Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014), the Court vacated a conviction for

using or carrying under § 924(c) based on aiding and abetting because of error in the jury

instructions. In the wake of *Rosemond*, the Sixth Circuit reversed a § 924(c) conviction, finding

the jury instruction using the first sentence of paragraph 4.01(2)(C) to be plain error. The court

explained, “*Rosemond* clarifies that intent must go to the *entire crime* – that [defendant] intended

to aid in an *armed* bank robbery.” United States v. Henry, 2015 WL 4774558, at \*2, (6th Cir.

2015) (italics in original, *citing Rosemond*, 134 S. Ct. at 1248, 1251). *See also* United States v.

Richardson, 2015 WL 4174809, at \*14-15 (6th Cir. July 13, 2015) (jury instruction was error but

harmless). If the crime underlying the aiding and abetting instruction is based on 18 U.S.C. §

924(c)(1)(A)(i), *i.e.*, Using or Carrying a Firearm During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence

or Drug Trafficking Crime (see Instruction 12.02) or Possessing a Firearm in Furtherance of a

Crime of Violence or Drug Trafficking Crime (see Instruction 12.03), use the accomplice liability

instructions provided for those particular crimes in Instructions 12.04 and 12.05 respectively.

In United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1998), the court reversed convictions

for aiding and abetting a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (making false statements to a federal

agency) for two reasons. First, the court found the evidence of mens rea insufficient because the

defendant lacked the “specific intent” required for aiding and abetting. *Id.* at 487. The

government’s theory was that the defendant aided and abetted the making of false statements in

vouchers for Section 8 housing eligibility because the vouchers were given to persons other than

those on the waiting list. Because there was no evidence the defendant knew the function of the

waiting list for Section 8 housing, the court held the mens rea evidence did not meet the standard

for aiding and abetting. In addition, the court held that the evidence of conduct was insufficient

because the defendant failed to engage in the sort of active role necessary to an aiding and

abetting conviction. *Id*. There was no evidence the defendant helped in the preparation or

submission of the documents to HUD; overall, her participation was too limited to establish that

she did any act to bring about filing false documents with HUD.

Another offense raising unique questions on the application of § 2 is the Illegal Gambling

Business Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1955. In United States v. Hill, 55 F.3d 1197, 1199 (6th Cir.1995),

the court held that aiding and abetting liability for § 1955 offenses required particular knowledge

of the predicate offense. The court stated that § 1955 offenses required what it called a “refined

theory” of accomplice liability under § 2, *id.* at 1201, and explained that § 2 is applicable to §

1955, but only “when the aider and abettor has knowledge of the general nature and scope of the

illegal gambling enterprise and takes actions that demonstrate an intent to make the illegal

gambling enterprise succeed by assisting the principals in the conduct of the business.” *Id.* at

1199. The point of this standard is to insure that the defendant knew he was an accomplice to an

illegal gambling business which met the size, scope and duration requirements to be a federal

crime under § 1955. *Id.* at 1202.

The court has also resolved specific accomplice liability questions for the offense of

felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In United States v. Gardner, 488

F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2007), the court reversed the defendant’s conviction for aiding and abetting a

felon in possession on the basis that the evidence was insufficient. Accomplice liability requires

the government to prove that the defendant intended to aid the commission of the crime. The

court held that to meet this element in the context of a felon-in-possession charge, “the

government must show that the defendant knew or had cause to know that the principal was a

convicted felon.” *Id*. at 715, *citing* United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1286 (3d Cir. 1993).

Because the government presented no such evidence, the court reversed the conviction.

In order to aid and abet, one must do more than merely be present at the scene of the

crime and have knowledge of its commission. The Supreme Court set out the standard for the

offense in Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949), when it quoted Judge

Learned Hand's statement from United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938):

In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant 'in

some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that

he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed'.

*Accord*, United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 345, 348 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Quinn, 901

F.2d 522, 530 n.6 (6th Cir. 1990).

This requires proof of something more than mere association with a criminal venture.

United States v. Morrow, 923 F.2d 427, 436 (6th Cir. 1991). The government must prove "some

active participation or encouragement, or some affirmative act by (the defendant) designed to

further the (crime)." *Id.*

The defendant must act or fail to act with the intent to help the commission of a crime by

another. Simple knowledge that a crime is being committed, even when coupled with presence

at the scene, is usually not enough to constitute aiding and abetting. United States v. Luxenberg,

374 F.2d 241, 249-50 (6th Cir. 1967). Because of its importance in determining whether the

accused is an accomplice, the jury must be charged fully and accurately as to intent. The failure

to instruct on intent constitutes plain error. United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1972).

Although the defendant must be a participant rather than merely a knowing spectator

before he can be convicted as an aider and abettor, it is not necessary for the governments to

prove that he had an interest or stake in the transaction. United States v. Winston, 687 F.2d 832,

834 (6th Cir. 1982).

**4.01A CAUSING AN ACT**

(1) For you to find \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ guilty of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_, it is not necessary for you to find that he

personally committed the act charged in the indictment. You may also find him guilty if he

willfully caused an act to be done which would be a federal crime if directly performed by him

or another.

(2) But for you to find \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ guilty of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_, you must be convinced that the government

has proved each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(A) First, that the defendant caused \_\_\_\_\_ to commit the act of \_\_\_\_\_\_.

(B) Second, if the defendant or another person had committed the act it would have been

the crime of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

(C) And third, that the defendant willfully caused the act to be done.

(3) Proof that the defendant may have known about the crime, even if he was there when it was

committed, is not enough for you to find him guilty. You may consider this in deciding whether

the government has proved that he caused the act to be done, but without more it is not enough.

(4) What the government must prove is that the defendant willfully did something to cause the

act to be committed.

(5) If you are convinced that the government has proved all of these elements, say so by

returning a guilty verdict on this charge. If you have a reasonable doubt about any one of these

elements, then you cannot find the defendant guilty of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

**Committee Commentary**

(current through May 1, 2025)

This instruction is based on 18 U.S.C. § 2(b). Section 2 provides:

(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States, or aids, abets, counsels,

commands, induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.

(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done, which if directly performed by him or

another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.

In United States v. Hourani, 1999 WL 16472, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 431 (6th Cir. 1999)

(unpublished), a panel of the Sixth Circuit stated that § 2(b) was added “to clarify the implicit

meaning of § 2(a)” and then quoted the Historical and Statutory Notes accompanying the statute:

Section 2(b) is added to permit the deletion from many sections throughout the revision

of such phrases as “causes or procures.” The section as revised makes clear the

legislative intent to punish as a principal not only one who directly commits an offense

and one who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures” another to commit

an offense, but also anyone who causes the doing of an act which if done by him directly

would render him guilty of an offense against the United States. It removes all doubt that

one who puts in motion or assists in the illegal enterprise or causes the commission of an

indispensable element of the offense by an innocent agent or instrumentality, is guilty as a

principal even though he intentionally refrained from the direct act constituting the

completed offense.

*Hourani*, 1999 WL at 3-4, 1999 LEXIS at 9-10.

In United States v. Maselli, 534 F.2d 1197, 1200 (6th Cir. 1976), the court stated that §

2(b) deals with a class of activities which do not involve direct violations of the law, but which

contribute to the commission of the offense and are punishable in the same manner as direct

violations. *Maselli* also noted that subsections 2(a) and 2(b) are not mutually exclusive. “They

are . . . two statements of indirect illegal actions which carry the same consequences for the actor

as direct violation of criminal statutes.” *Id.* The court noted that it is proper to instruct on both

subsection 2(a) and 2(b) if the evidence justifies it. *Id.*

“[I]t has long been held that an indictment need not specifically charge ‘aiding and

abetting’ or ‘causing’ the commission of an offense against the United States, in order to support

a jury verdict based upon a finding of either.” United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68, 72 (6th Cir.

1966).

The difference between “inducing” in § 2(a) and “causing” in 2(b) has been described by

the Sixth Circuit as “somewhat unclear.” United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476, 486 (6th Cir.

1998). However, the Sixth Circuit recognized that § 2 has two parts. *See id.* (describing § 2 as

having “two components”). The court also stated that the two subsections are alternatives,

explaining that a defendant can be guilty as an accomplice “so long as the evidence shows that

she aided, abetted, counseled, induced, or procured the commission of the fraud, or, alternatively,

caused the false statements to be made.” *Id., citing* United States v. Twitty, 107 F.3d 1482, 1491

n.10 (11th Cir. 1997).

Paragraph (1) of the instruction is based on the language of the statute and United States

v. Keefer, 799 F.2d 1115, 1124 (6th Cir. 1986). *Keefer* held that under § 2(b) one can be

punished as a principal even though the agent who committed the act lacks criminal intent. *See*

*also* United States v. Norton, 700 F.2d 1072, 1077 (6th Cir. 1983) (defendants treated as

principals even though they may not have physically done the criminal act).

Paragraph (2) sets forth the elements that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by

the government. The elements are based upon the language of the statute and are further

supported by United States v. Gandy, 926 F.3d 248, 265 (6th Cir. 2019). In *Gandy*, the trial court

gave Inst. 4.01A with minor variations in language. The Sixth Circuit held that the instruction

was not plain error because the trial judge had instructed the jury properly on the elements of the

underlying offense, aggravated identity theft (see Inst. 15.04). *Gandy, supra*. The Sixth Circuit

also concluded under an abuse-of-discretion standard that sufficient evidence supported giving

Inst. 4.01A. *Gandy, id.* *See also* United States v. Murph, 707 F.2d 895, 896 (6th Cir.1983),

which held that the further act done by the agent was foreseen by the defendant and thus the

defendant “caused” the act to be done.

The word “willfully” in paragraph 2(C) is taken from the statute, and there is no case law

in the Sixth Circuit to guide the Committee further on defining this mens rea in the context of §

2(b). The Committee recommends that the term “willfully” be defined by reference to the

particular underlying act involved in the case. *Cf.* Instruction 2.05 Willfully (recommending no

general instruction on the meaning of willfully and suggesting in commentary that the term be

defined based on the particular offense involved).

Paragraph (3) is based upon United States v. Elkins, 732 F.2d 1280, 1287 (6th Cir. 1984)

(knowledge of the criminal conduct is insufficient).

Paragraph (4) of the instruction is based on the instruction quoted with approval in

*Hourani*, 1999 WL at 4, 1999 LEXIS at 10-11. The panel approved the instruction on

accomplice liability under § 2(b) although the instructions did not specify either §§ 2(a) or 2(b).

**4.02 ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT**

(1) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ is not charged with actually committing the crime of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_. Instead, he is

charged with helping someone else try to avoid being arrested, prosecuted or punished for that

crime. A person who does this is called an accessory after the fact.

(2) For you to find \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ guilty of being an accessory after the fact, the government must

prove each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(A) First, that the defendant knew someone else had already committed the crime of

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.

(B) Second, that the defendant then helped that person try to avoid being arrested,

prosecuted or punished.

(C) And third, that the defendant did so with the intent to help that person avoid being

arrested, prosecuted or punished.

(3) If you are convinced that the government has proved all of these elements, say so by

returning a guilty verdict on this charge. If you have a reasonable doubt about any one of these

elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of this charge.

**Committee Commentary 4.02**

(current through May 1, 2025)

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3 provides:

Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed,

receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his

apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.

Except as otherwise expressly provided by any Act of Congress, an accessory after the

fact shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum term of imprisonment or

fined not more than one-half the maximum fine prescribed for the punishment of the

principal, or both; or if the principal is punishable by life imprisonment or death, the

accessory shall be imprisoned not more than ten years.

A defendant is guilty under Section 3 where he knowingly assists an offender in order to

hinder the offender's apprehension, trial or punishment. He is distinguished from an aider and

abettor by not being entangled in the commission of the crime itself. For example, the driver of a

getaway car in a bank robbery may be treated as a principal, while a defendant who learns about

a crime afterwards and then supplies a place of refuge would be an accessory after the fact. It is

important that the felony not be in progress when assistance is rendered in order for the person to

be treated as an accessory after the fact, rather than as a principal.

The gist of being an accessory after the fact lies essentially in obstructing justice by

rendering assistance to hinder or prevent the arrest of the offender after he has committed

the crime . . . . The very definition of the crime also requires that the felony not be in

progress when the assistance is rendered because then he who renders assistance would

aid in the commission of the offense and be guilty as a principal.

United States v. Barlow, 470 F.2d 1245, 1252-53 (D.C.Cir.1972).

The line between an aider and abettor and an accessory after the fact is sometimes

difficult to draw, particularly when dealing with the escape immediately following the crime.

The defendant in United States v. Martin, 749 F.2d 1514, 1518 (11th Cir. 1985), was convicted of

aiding and abetting in a bank robbery under an instruction in which the jury was told that the

robbery was not complete as long as the money was being "asported or transported." The

Eleventh Circuit held that the instructions extended the crime too far since "the money could be

transported long after the possibility of hot pursuit had ended."